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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates strategies that defend against adversarial-example attacks
on image-classification systems by transforming the inputs before feeding them
to the system. Specifically, we study applying image transformations such as
bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, total variance minimization, and image
quilting before feeding the image to a convolutional network classifier. Our ex-
periments on ImageNet show that total variance minimization and image quilting
are very effective defenses in practice, in particular, when the network is trained on
transformed images. The strength of those defenses lies in their non-differentiable
nature and their inherent randomness, which makes it difficult for an adversary to
circumvent the defenses. Our best defense eliminates 60% of strong gray-box and
90% of strong black-box attacks by a variety of major attack methods.
1 INTRODUCTION
As the use of machine intelligence increases in security-sensitive applications (Bojarski et al., 2016;
Amodei et al., 2015), robustness has become a critical feature to guarantee the reliability of deployed
machine-learning systems. Unfortunately, recent research has demonstrated that existing models are
not robust to small, adversarially designed perturbations of the input (Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy
et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Kurakin et al., 2016a; Cisse et al., 2017a). Adversarially
perturbed examples have been deployed to attack image classification services (Liu et al., 2016),
speech recognition systems (Cisse et al., 2017a), and robot vision (Melis et al., 2017). The existence
of these adversarial examples has motivated proposals for approaches that increase the robustness of
learning systems to such examples (Papernot et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016a; Cisse et al., 2017b).
The robustness of machine learning models to adversarial examples depends both on the properties
of the model (i.e., Lipschitzness) and on the nature of the problem considered, e.g., on the input di-
mensionality and the Bayes error of the problem (Fawzi et al., 2015; 2016). Consequently, defenses
that aim to increase robustness against adversarial examples fall in one of two main categories. The
first category comprises model-specific strategies that enforce model properties such as invariance
and smoothness via the learning algorithm or regularization scheme (Shaham et al., 2015; Kurakin
et al., 2016a; Cisse et al., 2017b), potentially exploiting knowledge about the adversary’s attack
strategy (Goodfellow et al., 2015). The second category of defenses are model-agnostic: they try
to remove adversarial perturbations from the input. For example, in the context of image classifica-
tion, adversarial perturbations can be partly removed via JPEG compression (Dziugaite et al., 2016)
or image re-scaling (Lu et al., 2017). Hitherto, none of these defenses has been shown to be very
effective. Specifically, model-agnostic defenses appear too simple to sufficiently remove adversar-
ial perturbations from input images. By contrast, model-specific defenses make strong assumptions
about the nature of the adversary (e.g., on the norm that the adversary minimizes or on the number of
iterations it uses to generate the perturbation). Consequently, they do not satisfy Kerckhoffs (1883)
principle: the adversary can alter its attack to circumvent such model-specific defenses.
In this paper, we focus on increasing the effectiveness of model-agnostic defense strategies by de-
veloping approaches that (1) remove the adversarial perturbations from input images, (2) maintain
sufficient information in input images to correctly classify them, and (3) are still effective in settings
in which the adversary has information on the defense strategy being used. We explore transfor-
mations based on image cropping and rescaling, bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression (Dziugaite
∗This work was performed whilst Chuan Guo was at Facebook AI Research.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
71
1.
00
11
7v
3 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
5 J
an
 20
18
et al., 2016), total variance minimization (Rudin et al., 1992), and image quilting (Efros & Free-
man, 2001). We show that these defenses can be surprisingly effective against existing attacks, in
particular, when the convolutional network is trained on images that are transformed in a similar
way. The image transformations are good at countering the (iterative) fast gradient sign method
(Kurakin et al., 2016a), Deepfool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), and the Carlini & Wagner (2017)
attack, even in gray-box settings in which the model architecture and parameters are public. Our
strongest defenses are based on total variation minimization and image quilting: these defenses are
non-differentiable and inherently random, which makes it difficult for an adversary to get around
them. Our best defenses eliminate 60% of gray-box attacks and 90% of black-box attacks by four
major attack methods that perturb pixel values by 8% on average.
2 PROBLEM DEFINITION
We study defenses against non-targeted adversarial examples for image-recognition systems. Let
X = [0, 1]H×W×C be the image space. Given an image classifier h(·) and a source image x ∈ X ,
a non-targeted1 adversarial example of x is a perturbed image x′ ∈ X such that h(x) 6= h(x′)
and d(x,x′) ≤ ρ for some dissimilarity function d(·, ·) and ρ ≥ 0. Ideally, d(·, ·) measures the
perceptual difference between x and x′ but, in practice, the Euclidean distance d(x,x′) = ‖x−x′‖2
or the Chebyshev distance d(x,x′) = ‖x− x′‖∞ is most commonly used.
Given a set of N images {x1, . . . ,xN} and a target classifier h(·), an adversarial attack aims
to generate {x′1, . . . ,x′N} such that each x′n is an adversarial example for xn. The success
rate of an attack is measured by the proportion of predictions that was altered by an attack:
1
N
∑N
n=1 1[h(xn) 6= h(x′n)]. The success rate is generally measured as a function of the magnitude
of the perturbations performed by the attack, using the normalized L2-dissimilarity:
1
N
N∑
n=1
‖xn − x′n‖2
‖xn‖2 . (1)
A strong adversarial attack has a high success rate whilst its normalized L2-dissimilarity is low.
In most practical settings, an adversary does not have direct access to the model h(·) and has to do
a black-box attack. However, prior work has shown successful attacks by transferring adversarial
examples generated for a separately-trained model to an unknown target model (Liu et al., 2016).
Therefore, we investigate both the black-box and a more difficult gray-box attack setting: in our
gray-box setting, the adversary has access to the model architecture and the model parameters, but
is unaware of the defense strategy that is being used.
A defense is an approach that aims make the prediction on an adversarial example h(x′) equal
to the prediction on the corresponding clean example h(x). In this study, we focus on image-
transformation defenses g(x) that perform prediction via h(g(x′)). Ideally, g(·) is a complex, non-
differentiable, and potentially stochastic function: this makes it difficult for an adversary to attack
the prediction model h(g(x)) even when the adversary knows both h(·) and g(·).
3 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
One of the first successful attack methods is the fast gradient sign method (FGSM; Goodfellow
et al. (2015)). Let `(·, ·) be the differentiable loss function that was used to train the classifier h(·),
e.g., the cross-entropy loss. The FGSM adversarial example corresponding to a source input x and
true label y is:
x′ = x+  · sign (∇x`(x, y)) , (2)
for some  > 0 that governs the perturbation magnitude. A stronger variant of this attack, called
iterative FGSM (I-FGSM; Kurakin et al. (2016b)), iteratively applies the FGSM update:
x(m) = x(m−1) +  · sign
(
∇x(m−1)`(x(m−1), y)
)
, (3)
1Given a target class c, a targeted adversarial example x′ is an example that satisfies h(x′) = c. We do not
consider targeted attacks in this study.
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FGSM I-FGSM
DeepFool Carlini-Wagner
Adversary strength (normalized L2 dissimilarity)→
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Adversary strength (normalized L2 dissimilarity)→
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Adversary strength (normalized L2 dissimilarity)→
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Adversary strength (normalized L2 dissimilarity)→
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Figure 1: Adversarial images and corresponding perturbations at five levels of normalized L2-
dissimilarity for all four attacks.
where m = 1, . . . ,M ; x(0) = x; and x′ = x(M). The number of iterations M is set such that
h(x′) 6= h(x). Both FGSM and I-FGSM approximately minimize the Chebyshev distance between
the inputs and the adversarial examples they generate.
Alternative attacks aim to minimize the Euclidean distance between the input and the adversarial
example instead. For instance, assuming h(·) is a binary classifier, DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016) projects x onto a linearization of the decision boundary defined by h(·) forM iterations:
x(m) = x(m−1) −  · h(x
(m−1))
‖∇x(m−1)h(x(m−1))‖22
∇x(m−1)h
(
x(m−1)
)
, (4)
where x(0) and x′ are defined as in I-FGSM. The multi-class variant of DeepFool performs the
projection onto the nearest class boundaries. The linearization performed in DeepFool is particularly
well suited for ReLU-networks, as these represent piecewise linear class boundaries.
Carlini-Wagner’s L2 attack (CW-L2; Carlini & Wagner (2017)) is an optimization-based attack
that combines a differentiable surrogate for the model’s classification accuracy with an L2-penalty
term. Let Z(x) be the operation that computes the logit vector (i.e., the output before the softmax
layer) for an input x, and Z(x)k be the logit value corresponding to class k. The untargeted variant
of CW-L2 finds a solution to the unconstrained optimization problem
min
x′
[‖x− x′‖22 + λf max (−κ, Z(x′)h(x) −max{Z(x′)k : k 6= h(x)})] , (5)
where κ denotes a margin parameter, and where the parameter λf trades off the perturbation norm
and the hinge loss of predicting a different class. We perform the minimization over x′ using the
Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) for 100 iterations with an initial learning rate of 0.001.
All of the aforementioned attacks enforce that x′ ∈ X by clipping values between 0 and 1. Figure 1
shows adversarial images produced by all four attacks at five normalized L2-dissimilarity levels.
4 DEFENSES
Adversarial attacks alter particular statistics of the input image in order to change the model predic-
tion. Indeed, adversarial perturbations x−x′ have a particular structure, as illustrated by Figure 1.
We design and experiment with image transformations that alter the structure of these perturbations,
and investigate whether the alterations undo the effects of the adversarial attack. We investigate
five image transformations: (1) image cropping and rescaling, (2) bit-depth reduction, (3) JPEG
compression, (4) total variance minimization, and (5) image quilting.
3
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Figure 2: Illustration of total variance minimiza-
tion and image quilting applied to an original and
an adversarial image (produced using I-FGSM
with =0.03, corresponding to a normalized L2-
dissimilarity of 0.075). From left to right, the
columns correspond to: (1) no transformation, (2)
total variance minimization, and (3) image quilt-
ing. From top to bottom, rows correspond to: (1)
the original image, (2) the corresponding adver-
sarial image produced by I-FGSM, and (3) the ab-
solute difference between the two images above.
Difference images were multiplied by a constant
scaling factor to increase visibility.
We first introduce three simple image transfor-
mations: image cropping-rescaling, bit-depth
reduction (Xu et al., 2017), and JPEG com-
pression and decompression (Dziugaite et al.,
2016). Image cropping-rescaling has the ef-
fect of altering the spatial positioning of the
adversarial perturbation, which is important in
making attacks successful. Following He et al.
(2016), we crop and rescale images at training
time as part of the data augmentation. At test
time, we average predictions over random im-
age crops. Bit-depth reduction (Xu et al., 2017)
perform a simple type of quantization that can
removes small (adversarial) variations in pixel
values from an image; we reduce images to
3 bits in our experiments. JPEG compression
(Dziugaite et al., 2016) removes small perturba-
tions in a similar way; we perform compression
at quality level 75 (out of 100).
4.2 TOTAL VARIANCE MINIMIZATION
An alternative way of removing adversarial per-
turbations is via a compressed sensing approach
that combines pixel dropout with total varia-
tion minimization (Rudin et al., 1992). This
approach randomly selects a small set of pix-
els, and reconstructs the “simplest” image that
is consistent with the selected pixels. The re-
constructed image does not contain the adver-
sarial perturbations because these perturbations
tend to be small and localized.
Specifically, we first select a random set of pix-
els by sampling a Bernoulli random variable X(i, j, k) for each pixel location (i, j, k); we maintain
a pixel when X(i, j, k) = 1. Next, we use total variation minimization to constructs an image z that
is similar to the (perturbed) input image x for the selected set of pixels, whilst also being “simple”
in terms of total variation by solving:
min
z
‖(1−X) (z− x)‖2 + λTV · TVp(z). (6)
Herein,  denotes element-wise multiplication, and TVp(z) represents the Lp-total variation of z:
TVp(z) =
K∑
k=1
 N∑
i=2
‖z(i, :, k)− z(i− 1, :, k)‖p +
N∑
j=2
‖z(:, j, k)− z(:, j − 1, k)‖p
 . (7)
The total variation (TV) measures the amount of fine-scale variation in the image z, as a result of
which TV minimization encourages removal of small (adversarial) perturbations in the image. The
objective function (6) is convex in z, which makes solving for z straightforward. In our imple-
mentation, we set p = 2 and employ a special-purpose solver based on the split Bregman method
(Goldstein & Osher, 2009) to perform total variance minimization efficiently.
The effectiveness of TV minimization is illustrated by the images in the middle column of Figure 2:
in particular, note that the adversarial perturbations that were present in the background for the non-
transformed image (see bottom-left image) have nearly completely disappeared in the TV-minimized
adversarial image (bottom-center image). As expected, TV minimization also changes image struc-
ture in non-homogeneous regions of the image, but as these perturbations were not adversarially
designed we expect the negative effect of these changes to be limited.
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modeltransformTraining:
Testing:
Section 5.2 (Figure 4)
Section 5.3 (Figure 5)
Section 5.5 (Figure 6)
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Block diagram detailing the differences between the experimental setups in Section 5.2,
5.3, and 5.4. We train networks (a) on regular images or (b) on transformed images; we test the
networks on transformed adversarial images. For each of the three setups, dashed arrows indicate
which model is used by the adversary and which model is used by the classification model.
4.3 IMAGE QUILTING
Image quilting (Efros & Freeman, 2001) is a non-parametric technique that synthesizes images by
piecing together small patches that are taken from a database of image patches. The algorithm places
appropriate patches in the database for a predefined set of grid points, and computes minimum graph
cuts (Boykov et al., 2001) in all overlapping boundary regions to remove edge artifacts.
Image quilting can be used to remove adversarial perturbations by constructing a patch database
that only contains patches from “clean” images (without adversarial perturbations); the patches used
to create the synthesized image are selected by finding the K nearest neighbors (in pixel space) of
the corresponding patch from the adversarial image in the patch database, and picking one of these
neighbors uniformly at random. The motivation for this defense is that the resulting image only
consists of pixels that were not modified by the adversary — the database of real patches is unlikely
to contain the structures that appear in adversarial images.
The right-most column of Figure 2 illustrates the effect of image quilting on adversarial images.
Whilst interpretation of these images is more complicated due to the quantization errors that image
quilting introduces, it is interesting to note that the absolute differences between quilted original and
the quilted adversarial image appear to be smaller in non-homogeneous regions of the image. This
suggests that TV minimization and image quilting lead to inherently different defenses.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We performed five experiments to test the efficacy of our defenses. The experiment in Section 5.2
considers gray-box attacks: it applies the defenses on adversarial images before using them as input
into a convolutional network trained to classify “clean” images. In this setting, the adversary has ac-
cess to the model architecture and parameters but is unaware of the defense strategy. The experiment
in Section 5.3 focuses on a black-box setting: it replaces the convolutional network by networks that
were trained on images with a particular input-transformation. The experiment in Section 5.4 com-
bines our defenses with ensembling and model transfer. The experiment in Section 5.5 investigates
to what extent networks trained on image-transformations can be attacked in a gray-box setting.
The experiment in Section 5.6 compares our defenses with prior work. The setup of our gray-box
and black-box experiments is illustrated in Figure 3. Code to reproduce our results is available at
https://github.com/facebookresearch/adversarial_image_defenses.
5.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We performed experiments on the ImageNet image classification dataset. The dataset comprises
1.2 million training images and 50, 000 test images that correspond to one of 1, 000 classes. Our
adversarial images are produced by attacking a ResNet-50 model (He et al., 2016). We evaluate
our defense strategies against the four adversarial attacks presented in Section 3. We measure the
strength of an adversary in terms of its normalized L2-dissimilarity and report classification accu-
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Figure 4: Top-1 classification accuracy of ResNet-50 tested on transformed adversarial images pro-
duced by four attacks using five image transformations in a gray-box setting: (1) cropping-rescaling,
(2) bit-depth reduction, (3) JPEG compression, (4) total variance minimization, and (5) image quilt-
ing. The dotted line shows the top-1 accuracy of the ResNet-50 model on non-adversarial images,
providing an upper bound on the effectiveness of a defense. An L2-dissimilarity of 0.00 corresponds
to the classification accuracy on non-adversarial images. Higher is better.
racies as a function of the normalized L2-dissimilarity. To produce adversarial images like those in
Figure 1, we set the normalized L2-dissimilarity for each of the attacks as follows:
• FGSM. Increasing the step size  increases the normalized L2-dissimilarity.
• I-FGSM. We fix M=10, and increase  to increase the normalized L2-dissimilarity.
• DeepFool. We fix M=5, and increase  to increase the normalized L2-dissimilarity.
• CW-L2. We fix κ=0 and λf =10, and multiply the resulting perturbation by an appropri-
ately chosen  ≥ 1 to alter the normalized L2-dissimilarity.
We fixed the hyperparameters of our defenses in all experiments: specifically, we set pixel dropout
probability p=0.5 and the regularization parameter of the total variation minimizer λTV=0.03. We
use a quilting patch size of 5×5 and a database of 1, 000, 000 patches that were randomly selected
from the ImageNet training set. We use the nearest neighbor patch (i.e., K =1) for experiments in
Sections 5.2 and 5.3, and randomly select a patch from one of K=10 nearest neighbors in all other
experiments. In the cropping defense, we sample 30 crops of size 90×90 from the 224×224 input
image, rescale the crops to 224×224, and average the model predictions over all crops.
5.2 GRAY BOX: IMAGE TRANSFORMATIONS AT TEST TIME
Figure 4 shows the top-1 accuracy of a ResNet-50 tested on transformed adversarial images as a
function of the adversary strength for each of the four attacks. Each plot shows results for five
different transformations we apply to the images at test time (viz., image cropping-rescaling, bit-
depth reduction, JPEG compression, total variation minimization, and image quilting). The dotted
line shows the classification error of the ResNet-50 model on images that are not adversarially
perturbed, i.e., it gives an upper bound on the accuracy that defenses can achieve.
In line with the results reported in the literature, the four adversaries successfully attack the ResNet-
50 model in nearly all cases (FGSM has a slightly lower favorable attack rate of 80−90%) when the
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Figure 5: Top-1 classification accuracy of ResNet-50 trained and tested on transformed adversar-
ial images produced by four attacks using five image transformations in a black-box setting: (1)
cropping-rescaling, (2) bit-depth reduction, (3) JPEG compression, (4) total variance minimization,
and (5) image quilting. The dotted line represents the top-1 accuracy of the ResNet-50 model on non-
adversarial images, providing an upper bound on the effectiveness of a defense. An L2-dissimilarity
of 0.00 corresponds to the classification accuracy on non-adversarial images. Higher is better.
input images are not transformed. The results also show that the proposed image transformations are
capable of partly eliminating the effect of the attacks. In particular, ensembling 30 predictions over
different, random image crops is very efficient: these predictions are correct for 40−60% of the im-
ages (note that 76% is the highest accuracy that one can expect to achieve). This result suggests that
adversarial examples are susceptible to changes in the location and scale of the adversarial perturba-
tions. While not as effective, image transformations based on total variation minimization and image
quilting also successfully defend against adversarial examples from all four attacks: applying these
transformations allows us to classify 30−40% of the images correctly. This result suggests that total
variation minimization and image quilting can successfully remove part of the perturbations from
adversarial images. In particular, the accuracy of the image-quilting defense hardly deteriorates as
the strength of the adversary increases. However, the quilting transformation does severely impact
the model’s accuracy on non-adversarial images.
5.3 BLACK BOX: IMAGE TRANSFORMATIONS AT TRAINING AND TEST TIME
The high relative performance of image cropping-rescaling in 5.2 may be partly explained by the
fact that the convolutional network was trained on randomly cropped-rescaled images2, but not on
any of the other transformations. This implies that independent of whether an image is adversarial
or not, the network is more robust to image cropping-rescaling than it is to those transformations.
The results in Figure 4 suggest that this negatively affects the effectiveness of these defenses, even if
the defenses are successful in removing the adversarial perturbation. To investigate this, we trained
ResNet-50 models on transformed ImageNet training images. We adopt the standard data augmen-
tation from He et al. (2016), but apply bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, TV minimization, or
image quilting on the resized image crop before feeding it to the network. We measure the classifi-
cation accuracy of the resulting networks on the same adversarial images as before. Note that this
implies that we assume a black-box setting in this experiment.
2We trained the ResNet-50 model using the data-augmentation scheme of He et al. (2016).
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Quilting TVM + Quilting Cropping + TVM + Quilting
RN50 RN101 DN169 Iv4 RN50 RN101 DN169 Iv4 RN50 RN101 DN169 Iv4
No Attack 70.07 72.56 70.18 73.01 72.38 74.74 73.10 75.55 72.14 74.53 72.92 75.10
FGSM 65.45 68.50 65.96 67.53 65.70 68.77 67.09 69.19 66.65 69.75 67.86 70.37
I-FGSM 65.59 68.72 66.16 69.29 65.84 69.10 67.32 71.05 67.03 70.14 68.20 71.52
DeepFool 65.20 68.73 65.86 68.70 65.80 69.34 67.40 71.03 67.11 70.49 68.62 71.47
CW-L2 64.11 67.72 65.00 68.14 63.99 68.20 66.08 70.13 65.31 69.14 66.96 70.50
Table 1: Top-1 classification accuracy of ensemble and model transfer defenses (columns) against
four black-box attacks (rows). The four networks we use to classify images are ResNet-50 (RN50),
ResNet-101 (RN101), DenseNet-169 (DN169), and Inception-v4 (Iv4). Adversarial images are
generated by running attacks against the ResNet-50 model, aiming for an average normalized L2-
dissimilarity of 0.06. Higher is better. The best defense against each attack is typeset in boldface.
We present the results of these experiments in Figure 5. Training convolutional networks on images
that are transformed in the same way as at test time, indeed, dramatically improves the effectiveness
of all transformation defenses. In our experiments, the image-quilting defense is particularly effec-
tive against strong attacks: it successfully defends against 80−90% of all four attacks, even when
the normalized L2-dissimilarity of the attack approaches 0.08.
5.4 BLACK BOX: ENSEMBLING AND MODEL TRANSFER
We evaluate the efficacy of (1) ensembling different defenses and (2) “transferring” attacks to dif-
ferent network architectures (in a black-box setting). Specifically, we measured the accuracy of four
networks using ensembles of defenses on adversarial images generated to attack a ResNet-50; the
four networks we consider are ResNet-50, ResNet-101, DenseNet-169 (Huang et al., 2017), and
Inception-v4 (Szegedy et al., 2017). To ensemble the image quilting and TVM defenses, we av-
erage the image-quilting prediction (using a weight of 0.5) with model predictions for 10 different
TVM reconstructions (with a weight of 0.05 each), re-sampling the pixels used to measure the re-
construction error each time. To combine cropping with other transformations, we first apply those
transformations and average predictions over 10 random crops from the transformed images.
The results of our ensembling experiments are presented in Table 1. The results show that gains
of 1− 2% in classification accuracy can be achieved by ensembling different defenses, whereas
transferring attacks to different convolutional network architectures can lead to an improvement of
2−3%. Inception-v4 performs best in our experiments, but this may be partly due to that network
having a higher accuracy even in non-adversarial settings. Our best black-box defense achieves an
accuracy of about 71% against all four defenses: the attacks deteriorate the accuracy of our best
classifier (which combines cropping, TVM, image quilting, and model transfer) by at most 6%.
5.5 GRAY BOX: IMAGE TRANSFORMATIONS AT TRAINING AND TEST TIME
The previous experiments demonstrated the effectiveness of image transformations against adver-
sarial images, in particular, when convolutional networks are re-trained to be robust to those image
transformations. In this experiment, we investigate to what extent the resulting networks can be at-
tacked in a gray-box setting in which the adversary has access to those networks (but does not have
access to the input transformations applied at test time). We use the four attack methods to generate
novel adversarial images against the transformation-robust networks trained in 5.3, and measure the
accuracy of the networks on these novel adversarial images in Figure 6.
The results show that bit-depth reduction and JPEG compression are weak defenses in such a gray-
box setting. Whilst their relative ordering varies between attack methods, image cropping and rescal-
ing, total variation minimization, and image quilting are fairly robust defenses in the white-box set-
ting. Specifically, networks using these defenses classify up to 50% of adversarial images correctly.
5.6 COMPARISON WITH PRIOR WORK
In our final set of experiments, we compare our defenses with the state-of-the-art ensemble adver-
sarial training approach proposed by Trame`r et al. (2017). Ensemble adversarial training fits the
parameters of a convolutional network on adversarial examples that were generated to attack an
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Figure 6: Top-1 classification accuracy of ResNet-50 trained and tested on transformed adversar-
ial images produced by four attacks using five image transformations in a gray-box setting: (1)
cropping-rescaling, (2) bit-depth reduction, (3) JPEG compression, (4) total variance minimization,
and (5) image quilting. The dotted line represents the top-1 accuracy of the ResNet-50 model on
non-adversarial images, providing an upper bound on the effectiveness of a defense. L2-dissimilarity
of 0 corresponds to clean image accuracy. Higher is better.
ensemble of pre-trained models. These adversarial examples are very diverse, which makes the con-
volutional network being trained robust to a variety of adversarial perturbation. In our experiments,
we used the model released by Trame`r et al. (2017): an Inception-Resnet-v2 (Szegedy et al., 2016)
trained on adversarial examples generated by FGSM against Inception-Resnet-v2 and Inception-v3
models. We compare the model to our ResNet-50 models with image cropping, total variance mini-
mization, and image quilting defenses. We note that there are two small differences in terms of the
assumptions that ensemble adversarial training makes and the assumptions our defenses make: (1) in
contrast to ensemble adversarial training, our defenses assume that part of the defense strategy (viz.,
the input transformation) is unknown to the adversary, and (2) in contrast to ensemble adversarial
training, our defenses assume no prior knowledge of the attacks being used. The former difference
is advantageous to our defenses, whereas the latter difference gives our defenses a disadvantage
compared to ensemble adversarial training.
Table 2 compares the classification accuracies of the defense strategief on adversarial examples
with a normalized L2-dissimilarity of 0.06. The results show that ensemble adversarial training
works better on FGSM attacks (which it uses at training time), but is outperformed by each of the
transformation-based defenses all other attacks. Input transformations particularly outperform en-
semble adversarial training against the iterative attacks: our defense are are 18−24× more robust
than ensemble adversarial training against DeepFool attacks. Combining cropping, TVM, and quilt-
ing increases the accuracy of our defenses against DeepFool gray-box attacks to 51.51% (compared
to 1.84% for ensemble adversarial training).
6 DISCUSSION
The results from this study suggest there exists a range of image transformations that have the
potential to remove adversarial perturbations while preserving the visual content of the image: one
merely has to train the convolutional network on images that were transformed in the same way. A
critical property that governs which image transformations are most effective in practice is whether
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Cropping TVM Quilting Ensemble Training(Trame`r et al., 2017)
No Attack 65.41 66.29 69.66 80.3
FGSM 49.52 31.37 39.55 69.15
I-FGSM 43.89 40.99 33.22 5.07
DeepFool 44.92 44.69 34.54 1.84
CW-L2 41.06 48.41 30.51 22.23
Table 2: Top-1 classification accuracy on images perturbed using attacks against ResNet-50 models
trained on input-transformed images, and an Inception-v4 model trained using ensemble adversarial.
Adversarial images are generated by running attacks against the models, aiming for an average
normalized L2-dissimilarity of 0.06. The best defense against each attack is typeset in boldface.
an adversary can incorporate the transformation in its attack. For instance, median filtering likely
is a weak remedy because one can backpropagate through the median filter, which is sufficient to
perform any of the attacks described in Section 3. A strong input-transformation defense should,
therefore, be non-differentiable and randomized, a strategy has been previously shown to be effective
(Wang et al., 2016a;b). Our two best defenses possess both properties:
1. Both total variation minimization and image quilting are difficult to differentiate through.
Specifically, total variation minimization involves solving a complex minimization of a
function that is inherently random. Image quilting involves a discrete variable that selects
the patch from the database, which is a non-differentiable operation, and the graph-cut
optimization complicates the use of differentiable approximations (Maddison et al., 2017).
2. Both total variation minimization and image quilting give rise to randomized defenses.
Total variation minimization randomly selects the pixels it uses to measure reconstruction
error on when creating the denoised image. Image quilting randomly selects one of the K
nearest neighbors uniformly at random. The inherent randomness of our defenses makes it
difficult to attack the model: it implies the adversary has to find a perturbation that alters
the prediction for the entire distribution of images that could be used as input, which is
harder than perturbing a single image (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017).
Our results with gray-box attacks suggest that randomness is particularly crucial in developing
strong defenses. Therefore, we surmise that total variation minimization, image quilting, and related
methods (Dong et al., 2011) are stronger defenses than deterministic denoising procedures such as
bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, or non-local means (Buades, 2005). Defenses based on
total variation minimization and image quilting also have an advantage over adversarial-training ap-
proaches (Kurakin et al., 2016a): an adversarially trained network is differentiable, which implies
that it can be attacked using the methods in Section 3. An additional disadvantage of adversarial
training is that it focuses on a particular attack; by contrast, transformation-based defenses general-
ize well across attack methods because they are model-agnostic.
While our study focuses exclusively on image classification, we expect similar defenses to be useful
in other domains for which successful attacks have been developed, such as semantic segmentation
and speech recognition (Cisse et al., 2017a; Zhang et al., 2017). In speech recognition, for example,
total variance minimization can be used to remove perturbations from waveforms, and one could
develop “spectrogram quilting” techniques that reconstruct a spectrogram by concatenating “spec-
trogram patches” along the temporal dimension. We leave such extensions to future work. In future
work, we also intend to study combinations of our input-transformation defenses with ensemble
adversarial training (Trame`r et al., 2017), and we intend to investigate new attack methods that are
specifically designed to circumvent our input-transformation defenses.
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